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Back to its Roots: How § 1983 Must Return to its
Origins to Provide a Remedy for the Inupiat Against
Oil Drilling in Alaska’s Arctic Circle
Julia Prochazka*
ABSTRACT
As demand for oil and gas grows, companies are looking to the Chukchi Sea in Alaska as
a potential source of oil and wealth. However, the land along the Chukchi Sea is also home to
the Native Alaskan community of the Inupiat. Drilling comes in direct conflict with the way of the
life of the Inupiat. Considering this conflict, this Comment explores the difficulty of a § 1983
claim for the Inupiat. The failure of § 1983 to provide a remedy for the Inupiat provides a frame
through which to view how § 1983 has deviated from its plain language and original purpose.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Chukchi Sea in northwestern Alaska is a new frontier of oil and gas development. As
demand grows, the United States seeks greater energy independence, and oil companies, like
Shell, are looking to the Chukchi Sea as a potential source of oil and wealth. The land along the
Chukchi Sea has been the home to the Native Alaskan community of the Inupiat for hundreds of
years. As Shell begins exploratory drilling in the Chukchi Sea, our nation’s expanding drive for
oil and gas puts the Native Alaskan culture, values, and tradition at risk. As the Inupiat’s sources
of subsistence and way of life come under attack, this paper explores whether the law provides a
remedy for the Inupiat to protect from the effects of drilling on the Continental Shelf. 1
I first establish background on environmental justice, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Shell’s history of
drilling in the region, and the culture of the Inupiat. Second, I explore the potential arguments to
support the Inupiat’s claim and difficulties in bringing a § 1983 claim. Despite the expansive
language in § 1983, the statute only protects rights derived from other laws, usually the
Constitution or other federal statutes. These outside sources of law fail to provide a protectable
right for the Inupiat. Given the purpose of anti-discrimination law, § 1983’s failure to provide a
remedy for Native Alaskans demonstrates how the jurisprudence has deviated from the statute’s
original promise for minority communities. I argue the court should return to the plain language
and purpose of the statute in order to fulfill the goals of anti-discrimination law and protect the
Inupiat.

* J.D., Northwestern University School of Law, 2017; B.A., Emory University, 2013. I am extremely grateful to the
editors of the Northwestern Journal of Law and Social Policy for their time, guidance, and invaluable edits. In
addition, I would like to thank Professor Destiny Peery for her advice in developing this topic and her continuous
support throughout the writing process.
1
See John W. Carnahan, Room at the Top: Inupiaq Eskimos Document Their History to Save Their Culture, 35
HIST. NEWS 16, 16–19 (1980) (showing that Native Alaskans depend on hunting fish and sea mammals for survival).
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II. ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE — WHERE IS THE REMEDY?

Environmental justice “seeks to create equal access to ecological resources and equal
protection from environmental hazards for all persons.” 2 The environmental movement asserts
that health, clean air, water, and open space are a fundamental right. 3 Often low-income and
minority communities are denied these fundamental rights due to pollution from industry sited
near their homes. These communities often lack the political and financial clout necessary to
prevent polluting facilities from building in their backyards.4
Environmental justice came to the forefront of the nation’s attention in the 1980s when
protestors in North Carolina brought to light the co-location of minority communities and
polluting facilities.5 Civil rights and political leaders protested the placement of a landfill that
contained polychlorinated-byphenyls (PCBs).6 The company sited the landfill in this particular
community because the residents, primarily African-American and low-income people, lacked
the political clout to oppose the siting decision.7 These protests prompted a United States
General Accounting Office study in 1983, which found African-Americans disproportionately
represent the populations near hazardous waste facilities. 8 Another 1987 study by the United
Church of Christ’s Commission for Racial Justice highlighted that those low income and
minority communities burdened with the nation’s pollution faced greater risks of exposure to
environmental contamination, which will adversely impact the health and well-being of
residents.9 Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, studies repeatedly demonstrated the
disproportionate burden of pollution on low-income and minority communities. 10
The studies brought the plight of low-income and minority communities to the attention of
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the President. In 1992, the EPA created the
Office of Environmental Justice. 11 The Office of Environmental Justice seeks to provide equal
protection for all communities from environmental and health hazards, as well as equal access to
the decision-making process in promoting a healthy environment. 12 Subsequently, the EPA
created the National Environmental Justice Advisory Counsel (NEJAC) to promote
communication about environmental justice issues.13 NEJAC is comprised of “representatives
from various communities, academia, industry, environmental and indigenous groups, and state,

2

Julia C. Rinne & Carol E. Dinkins, Environmental Justice: Merging Environmental Law and Ethics, 25 NAT. RES.
& ENV’T 3, 3 (2011).
3
Hilda L. Solis, Environmental Justice: An Unalienable Right for All, 30 HUM. RTS. 5, 5 (2003).
4
Id.
5
Eileen Gauna & Sheila Foster, Environmental Justice: Stakes, Stakeholders, Strategies, 30 HUM. RTS. 2, 2 (2003).
6
Rinne & Dinkins, supra note 2, at 3.
7
Id.
8
Joseph Ursic, Note, Finding a Remedy for Environmental Justice: Using 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to Fill in a Title VI Gap,
53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 497, 498 (2002).
9
Rinne & Dinkins, supra note 2, at 3-5.
10
Id. at 4.
11
Id.
12
EPA: OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE FACT SHEET, EPA’S COMMITMENT TO ENVIRONMENTAL J USTICE
(2009), https://www.epa.gov/nscep (search “environmental justice 2009” in search field; select first document in
search results).
13
Rinne & Dinkins, supra note 2, at 3.
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local, and tribal governments.” 14 The comprehensive group sought to bring together varied
perspectives to highlight environmental justice issues faced by local communities.
Congress responded to the new concern about environmental justice with the Environmental
Justice Act. The Act sought to identify the 100 most polluted cities and make it more difficult to
build pollution-producing facilities in these areas. 15 Another act proposed in 1993 and 1994 was
ultimately unsuccessful to stop discrimination in the siting of polluting facilities. 16
After a series of legislative failures, President Clinton passed an executive order that
instructed federal agencies to make environmental justice a key initiative. 17 The Executive Order
created a Federal Working Group on Environmental Justice (Working Group) to provide federal
agencies guidance in identifying and remedying “disproportionately high and adverse human
health or environmental effects on minority populations and low-income populations.”18 Part of
the Working Group included a Native American Task Force (Task Force), which facilitated
collaboration between the federal agencies and tribes to address unique problems for Native
American communities.19 However, the Executive Order’s environmental initiatives did not
provide a legal remedy for plaintiffs suffering from injuries caused by pollution. 20
Without a protected right from President Clinton’s Executive Order, plaintiffs sought relief
under the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.21 The 14th Amendment states that “[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall
. . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” 22 The Supreme
Court held in Washington v. Davis that in order to show a violation of the 14th Amendment’s
Equal Protection Clause, the plaintiff must prove the state actor’s discriminatory intent or
purpose.23 The Equal Protection Clause cannot reach private actions; it only applies to official
discriminatory actions.24 Several cases attempted to demonstrate intent through evidence of a
disparate impact, but they were rarely successful. 25 Most environmental justice cases are barred
from succeeding under Equal Protection by the intent requirement—industry defendants rarely
give definitive reasons, let alone intentionally discriminatory reasons, for siting a polluting
facility.
Environmental plaintiffs instead turned to Title VI § 602. Title VI prohibits
discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin in programs receiving federal
financial assistance. Title VI avoids the intent requirement of Equal Protection by providing a

14

Id.
Id.
16
Id.
17
Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations, 59 Fed.
Reg. 7629, 7629 (Feb. 16, 1994).
18
Id.
19
Quentin Pair & Bob Gough, Tribal Partnership: Lessons Learned, 30 HUM. RTS. 17, 17 (2003).
20
OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INVESTIGATION OF A LLEGATIONS CONCERNING
ENVIRONMENTAL J USTICE ISSUES IN EPA REGION 4, at 3 (2010), www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2010/20100614-10-N0145.pdf.
21
Ursic, supra note 8, at 501.
22
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
23
426 U.S. 229, 247–50 (1976).
24
Id. at 239; See also West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49-50 (1988) (stating that the Equal Protection Clause cannot
reach private actions).
25
See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
15
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private right of action for disparate impact. 26 In order to establish a disparate impact case under
Title VI, a plaintiff must demonstrate a connection between a facially neutral policy and the
adverse impact on a protected community. 27 The impact must be greater on a minority group
than on the majority. 28 This requirement is often an impossible barrier for environmental justice
plaintiffs. A siting decision in a minority community does cause a disparate impact on a minority
group, however, if the facility had been sited in an area with majority group members there
would be a disparate impact on that majority group in the same way. The siting of a facility
brings environmental risks, including air pollution and water pollution, that equally impacts
minority and majority groups near the facility. The impact of pollution is often disproportionate
on minority groups due to systemic issues, such as racial segregation in cities; thus, it is difficult
for minority groups to succeed in a disparate impact claim if the impact would be the same on a
majority group located near the pollution source. The disparate impact model does not account
for phenomena, like systemic racism or segregation. Pollution impacts each person living near to
it equally. Yet, a majority group member would not and does not live in the contested location to
bear the disproportionate burden. Once the connection has been established, the defendant can
show a “substantial legitimate justification” for the discriminatory practice. 29 In environmental
justice cases, the facilities often have an economic or public policy justification, such as the
location of the oil reserves or the importance of creating more jobs in a certain region. 30 In
response, the plaintiff bears the difficult burden of proving a less discriminatory means that
would serve the same objective. 31 For many environmental plaintiffs, they are not able to
demonstrate a less discriminatory means to achieve the goals of improved sanitation or tapping
oil reserves.
In Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Self, a non-profit residents
organization brought a claim under Title VI for the disparate impact of a waste processing
facility on African-American residents. 32 The district court, as a matter of first impression, held
that private plaintiffs could pursue an action under discriminatory effect regulations that were
promulgated by federal agencies under Title VI. 33 This survived until 2001, when the Supreme
Court in Alexander v. Sandoval held that § 602 does not afford a private right of action. 34 The
Court stated that a regulation can only create a private right of action that Congress has already
26

Ursic, supra note 8, at 505; Wyatt G. Sassman, Environmental Justice as Civil Rights Symposium, 18 RICH. J. L.
& PUB. INT. 441, 452 (2015); see S. Bronx Coal. for Clean Air, Inc. v. Conroy, 20 F.Supp.2d 565 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)
(alleging under Title VI that the transportation authority’s citing and transportation of hazardous waste disparately
impacted minority communities).
27
N.Y. City Envtl. Just. All. v. Giuliani, 214 F.3d 65, 69 (2d Cir. 1999).
28
Lucero v. Detroit Pub. Sch., 160 F.Supp.2d 767 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
29
N.Y. City Envtl. Just. All., 214 F.3d at 70.
30
Id.; see also Lucero, 160 F.Supp.2d at 795-97 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (discussing that a school successfully provided a
business justification for building a new school in a location that previously had hazardous waste to meet the
“substantial legitimate justification” requirement).
31
N.Y. City Envtl. Just. All., 214 F.3d at 70.
32
132 F.3d 925, 927 (3d Cir. 1997), vacated on other grounds, 524 U.S. 974 (1998).
33
Id. at 937; In 1984, the federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) adopted a standard to prohibit recipients
of federal funds from using methods of administering a program that would lead to a disparate impact. Ursic, supra
note 8, at 504.
34
532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001); see also John DiBari, Comment, How the Sandoval Ruling will Affect Environmental
Justice Plaintiffs, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1019, 1025-30 (2002) (discussing how the Sandoval ruling forecloses
environmental plaintiffs from employing § 602 to allege discriminatory disparate impact).
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established in a statute. 35 Despite the majority’s blockade of Title VI as an avenue for
environmental justice advocates, Justice Stevens suggested in his dissent that § 1983 could still
be used to enforce disparate impact regulations. 36
Tribal communities, like the Inupiat, have their cultural roots in the environment. 37
Native Alaskan’s cultural focus on the environment is evident in their diet, religion, and daily
lives. Due to this unique relationship with the environment, Indian communities are
disproportionately impacted by the pollution problem, raising significant environmental justice
concerns. The Inupiat, therefore, ought to be able to enforce disparate impact regulations to
protect their culture, religion, community, and lifestyle.
III. § 1983 POTENTIAL REMEDY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM
Under § 1983, plaintiffs must prove (1) a deprivation of a federal right and (2) that the person
who deprived the plaintiff of that right acted “under [the] color of state law.” 38 The state action
element must be a “deprivation . . . caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by
the State . . . or by a person for whom the State is responsible.” 39 Title 42 of United States Code
§ 1983 sought “to deter state actors from using the badge of their authority to deprive individuals
of their federally guaranteed rights.” 40 Congress intended the statute to override discriminatory
state laws, to provide a remedy where state law was inadequate, and to offer a federal remedy
where the state remedy, though adequate in theory, was not available in practice. 41
Despite the expansive language and purpose of the statute, the Supreme Court has instituted
strict requirements for plaintiffs to succeed under § 1983. Protectable rights do not stem from §
1983, but rather must derive from another law, usually the Constitution or other federal
statutes.42 Often plaintiffs point to protectable rights stemming from substantive due process in
the Equal Protection Clause, including rights from the incorporated Bill of Rights or non-textual
fundamental rights. 43 In the absence of an incorporated right or a non-textual fundamental right,
plaintiffs can claim rights under substantive due process to allow courts to create a tort-like
liability for state officials. 44
The courts have limited § 1983 by constraining the scope of state action. Courts have
interpreted “color of law” to include all actions taken by state and local officials, both those

35

Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 290.
Id. at 301; see S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771, 780-98 (3d Cir.
2001)(Plaintiffs attempted to use § 1983 for a disparate impact claim based on § 602. The Third Circuit held, in light
of Sandoval, § 602 could not create a right or private right of action so § 1983 could not serve as an enforcement
mechanism).
37
Dean B. Suagee, Environmental Justice and Indian Country, 30 HUM. R TS. 16, 16 (2003).
38
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
39
West, 487 U.S. at 49.
40
Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961), overruled by Monell v.
Dep’t of Soc. Servs. Of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (explaining that § 1983 may provide a federal remedy for
state abuses).
41
Monroe, 365 U.S. at 183.
42
Id.
43
Id.; see, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see generally CHARLES F. ABERNATHY, CIVIL RIGHTS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION: CASES AND M ATERIALS (5th ed. 2012).
44
CHARLES F. ABERNATHY, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION: C ASES AND M ATERIALS 87–88 (5th
ed. 2012).
36
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actions that are authorized and unauthorized, which violate state law.45 A state actor is one “who
carr[ies] a badge of authority of a State and represent[s] it in some capacity, whether they act in
accordance with their authority or misuse it.” 46 In very limited circumstances a private party can
be held as a state actor. For a plaintiff to prove state action, “the deprivation must be caused by
the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State . . . or by a person for whom the State
is responsible,” and the defendant “must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor.” 47
To find the state responsible for a private party’s action there must be a sufficiently close
nexus between the state and the challenged action such that the action appears to be an act of the
state.48 Courts have severely limited the reach of § 1983 to private parties. For a plaintiff to
prove state action, “the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some right or privilege
created by the State . . . or by a person for whom the State is responsible,” and “the party charged
with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor.”49 State
employees are the clearest example of a state actor. In West, the Supreme Court distinguished a
doctor at a state-run prison from a public defender by emphasizing that for state action the
relationship between the state and the private actor must be a cooperative or joint effort. 50 Unlike
the public defender who is adverse to the state, the Court found the doctor was working
collaboratively with the state. 51 A state employee must be working in conjunction with the state
to satisfy the state action doctrine.
Extensive regulation does not create a significant nexus between the state and the private
52
actor. However, the state action doctrine is satisfied if the private entity is performing a
function traditionally reserved to the government. 53 Another way to satisfy the state action
doctrine is to show the state “exercised coercive power or has provided such significant
encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the
State.”54 The requirements of state action place many barriers in front of plaintiffs seeking to
enforce their federally protected rights against private actors, which therefore must be overcome
with creative lawyering.

45

Id. at 132.
Monroe, 365 U.S. at 172.
47
West, 487 U.S. at 49.
48
Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 52 (1999).
49
West, 487 U.S. at 49.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 544 (1987); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991,
1004 (1982); compare Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 723-24 (1961) (holding that a restaurant
in a state parking facility was a state actor because the land and building were publicly owned, the building was
dedicated to public uses, upkeep of the building was paid by public funds).
53
Christopher R. Edgar, “The ‘Traditional State Function’ Doctrine: A Comparative Institutional Perspective, 1
N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 857, 860-61 (2005); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 849 (1982) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). (“[P]erformance of a public function is by itself sufficient to justify treating a private entity as a state
actor only where the function has been ‘traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State.’”).
54
Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004.
46
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IV. BACKGROUND: HOW THE INUPIAT’S SACRED LAND BECAME SHELL’S OIL OASIS
A. Background on Inupiat Indians and Tribal Rights
The Inupiat Eskimos have occupied the northernmost part of Alaska for more than a
century and a half.55 The community near the Chukchi Sea is known as the Kivalliñigmiut Nation
as part of the larger Inupiat Natives’ community in Northern Alaska. 56 The Inupiat people have
survived the harsh climate of the Arctic by adapting to the permafrost and sunless winters. 57 The
average winter temperatures range from negative fifteen to negative ten degrees Fahrenheit. 58
The Inupiat adapted by following the migratory patterns of their sources of food, such as caribou,
fish, whales, and seals. 59 By adapting to the Arctic cycles the Inupiat were able to create a life in
this difficult environment.
The Inupiat hunt from whaling camps miles from the shore. 60 Using skin boats from
walrus hide, the Inupiat people harvest whales and other sea mammals. 61 A major source of food
is the bowhead whale, which represents “the most visible manifestation of their age-old culture
remaining in the technological rush” of modern life. 62 The Inupiat language reflects the primacy
of the bowhead whale because there are twenty different words for bowhead whale, depending
on if a hunter has sighted a young female, young male, fat male, or an entire family of whales. 63
The Chukchi Sea is the only place where spring whaling of bowhead whales is possible.64 The
spring Whaling Feast represents the importance of hunting sea mammals in Inupiat culture.65
Whale meat serves as the base for many traditional dishes and the bones are used for structural
supports in their communities. 66 A successful bowhead whale hunt supports an entire community
of Inupiat for many months. 67 Skill in whaling defines a person’s status in the community. 68 Sea
mammals are more than just food for the Inupiat; the bones of the whales are used as supports in
buildings; jaw bones become sled runners; blubber fuels oil lamps; and beluga oils are used as
medicines.69 Each part of the whale plays a role in the life and endurance of the Inupiat people.
The Inupiat’s subsistence way of living defines their culture, religion, and value system.
The oil companies’ investment in the region brings to light the conflict between Inupiat
tradition and the benefits of modern industry. The taxes paid by the companies enabled the
Inupiat to build schools, government buildings, and the Inupiat History, Language, and Culture
55

ERNEST S. BURCH, JR., THE IÑUPIAQ ESKIMO NATIONS OF NORTHWEST ALASKA 3 (University of Alaska Press
1998).
56
Id. at 23.
57
Carnahan, supra note 1, at 16.
58
BURCH, supra note 55, at 26.
59
Carnahan, supra note 1, at 16.
60
Id.
61
Thomas F. Johnston, Community History and Environment as Wellspring of Inupiuq Eskimo Songtexts, 83
ANTHROPOS 162, 162 (1988).
62
Carnahan, supra note 1, at 16.
63
Johnston, supra note 61, at 165.
64
BURCH, supra note 55, at 28.
65
Johnston, supra note 61, at 165.
66
Id.
67
Jonathan D. Greenberg, The Artic in World Environmental History, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1307, 1333
(2009).
68
Johnston, supra note 61, at 163.
69
Id.; Edith Turner, From Shamans to Healers: The Survival of an Inupiaq Eskimo Skill, 31 ANTHROPOLOGICA 3, 13
(1989).
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Commission.70 The benefits derived from the taxes of oil drilling are not necessarily viewed as
negative despite the environmental impacts by all Native Alaskans. Tara Sweeney from the
Inupiat of the Arctic Slope is quoted as saying “‘[t]o the Inupiat, the revenue derived from [oil
drilling] will enable the Arctic Slope communities to continue living outside of Third World
conditions.’”71 The quality of life in these regions has improved at the expense of their traditional
lifestyle.
B. Background on Shell’s Oil Drilling in the Arctic Circle
Currently, the United States imports twenty-one percent of its oil, increased from the ten
percent imported in 1990. 72 The U.S. economy, industry, and military are dependent upon oil
production. In recent years there have been calls by politicians and citizens for greater energy
independence as unrest afflicts the Middle East. 73 The growth of the global population will bring
a doubling of the demand for energy. 74 Companies, like Shell, are scrambling to be the first to
meet this increasing demand by searching for domestic sources of oil, including Alaska. 75 Arctic
waters cover roughly thirteen percent of the world’s undiscovered petroleum, which could
provide the United States energy independence for more than a decade. 76
After years of the permitting process in 2015 the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management
(BOEM) approved Shell’s plan for exploratory drilling. 77 Shell began the regulatory process of
gaining approval for exploratory drilling in 2011. 78 Over those four years Shell invested $4.5
billion in the Alaska project. 79 In 2008 Shell paid $2.1 billion for the rights to 2 million acres of
land below the sea in the Arctic. 80 Notably, Shell is currently the only major oil company
investing in the Arctic Circle because other companies cited the risks and uncertain nature of the
70

Carnahan, supra note 1, at 17; see also Iñupiat History Language and Culture, N. SLOPE BOROUGH,
http://www.north-slope.org/departments/inupiat-history-language-and-culture (last visited Nov. 20, 2015).
71
Brian Stockes, Arctic Refuge Remains at Center of Energy Debate: Alaska Natives Split over Development,
Environment, 21 INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY A1, A1 (2001).
72
Barbara Hollingsworth, Forecast: In 2015, Imported Oil will Make Up Just 21% of US Consumption,
CNSNEWS.COM (Sept. 26, 2014, 12:55 PM), http://cnsnews.com/news/article/barbara-hollingsworth/forecast-2015imported-oil-will-make-just-21-us-consumption.
73
INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2014: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1-2 (2014),
https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/WEO_2014_ES_English_WEB.pdf.
74
Paul Barrett & Benjamin Elgin, Inside Shell’s Extreme Plan to Drill for Oil in the Arctic, BLOOMBERG:
BLOOMBERGBUSINESSWEEK (Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2015-08-05/inside-shell-sextreme-plan-to-drill-for-oil-in-the-arctic.
75
See INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, supra note 73; Unlocking Energy from Deep Water, SHELL GLOBAL,
http://www.shell.com/global/future-energy/deepwater/unlocking-energy-deep-water.html#iframeL3dlYmFwcHMvZGVlcF93YXRlci92Mi9pbmRleC5odG1s (last visited Nov. 20, 2015).
76
GEOLOGY, http://geology.com/articles/arctic-oil-and-gas/ (last visited March 29, 2017) Barrett & Elgin, supra
note 74 (showing Shell’s Chief Executive Officer emphasized the great prospects in Alaska).
77
Letter from David W. Johnston, Reg’l Supervisor, Off. of Leasing & Plans, Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt., to
Susan Childs, Alaska Venture Support Integrator/Manager, Shell Gulf of Mexico Inc. (Aug. 12, 2015), available at
http://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/BOEM/About_BOEM/BOEM_Regions/Alaska_Region/Leasing_and_Plans/Pl
ans/2015-08-12-Shell-Condition2-deviation-denial.pdf.
78
BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., SHELL: CHUKCHI SEA EXPLORATION PLAN, http://www.boem.gov/shellchukchi/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2015).
79
Jon Birger, Why Shell is Betting Billions to Drill for Oil in Alaska, FORTUNE (May 24, 2012),
http://fortune.com/2012/05/24/why-shell-is-betting-billions-to-drill-for-oil-in-alaska/.
80
Barrett & Elgin, supra note 74.
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oil reserves as reasons for holding off devoting resources in the region. 81 As oil prices have been
on the decline, critics wonder how Shell can invest in the Arctic Circle to the detriment of their
bottom line.82
However, this is not Shell’s first exploration in Alaska. In the 1990s Shell began
exploring and drilling in Cook Inlet outside of Anchorage. 83 While Shell worked in Cook’s Inlet,
they also explored in the Chukchi Sea, but this was terminated in favor of easier drilling
opportunities in the Gulf of Mexico. The Gulf’s more temperate climate made drilling less
dangerous and more likely to be profitable.
In May 2015 BOEM approved Shell’s permit for exploratory drilling, however, shortly
after Shell halted their exploration. Two rigs, the Polar Pioneer and the Noble Discoverer, settled
into the Chukchi Sea. However, BOEM ruled that Shell cannot drill wells simultaneously
because of the impact of noise pollution on marine mammals. 84
A few months after BOEM’s approval of drilling Shell unexpectedly stopped their
exploration.85 Shell cited the “disappointing” results as the reason for stopping activity in the
Chukchi Sea for the foreseeable future. 86 Nonetheless, Shell still holds 100 percent working
interest in the Chukchi Sea and this does not mark the end of oil exploration in the northwestern
region of Alaska. Shell’s (former) President, Marvin Odum, emphasized the continued strategic
importance of the region despite the disappointing outcome of exploratory tests. 87 Industry
experts state that when the oil prices improve, offshore exploration in Alaska will restart. 88 The
concerns for the Inupiat continue despite Shell’s recent halt in exploratory drilling.
C. Potential Environmental Impacts of Drilling
The Chukchi Sea is a pristine habitat for many of the world’s unique Arctic animals.
Environmentalists and Native Alaskans have raised many concerns about the devastating and
irreparable impacts of drilling in the Chukchi Sea. The Arctic Circle and Chukchi Sea are home
to seventeen different species of whale, including ninety percent of the narwhal population. 89
Most marine mammals, including the endangered bowhead whales, live in the Chukchi Sea
during the summer months and move south to the Bering Strait for the winter time, making the
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http://www.bbc.com/news/business-34377434.
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http://ak.audubon.org/chukchi-sea (last visited Nov. 20, 2015).
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Chukchi Sea an important migration area. 90 “Almost the entire population of bowhead whales
travels along the Chukchi Sea coast . . . during the spring months, from April through June.” 91
Additionally, this is an important habitat for beluga whales, who are uniquely sensitive to human
disturbance in the form of noise. 92 Grey whales feed in the Chukchi Sea during the summer
months.93 Whales are central to the Inupiat culture and form the foundation of their community. 94
In addition to whales, the Chukchi Sea serves as the habitat for walruses, seabirds, and roughly
half of America’s polar bears. 95 The presence of ice allows for the development of
phytoplankton, which is the base of the food chain.96 The Chukchi Sea is uniquely shallow,
allowing for wildlife to develop on the ocean floor. 97
Shell’s drilling will create noise pollution which greatly impacts marine mammals,
especially cetaceans like whales and dolphins. Marine mammals are vocal and dependent on
sound for finding food, reproduction, communication, and navigation. 98 Oil exploration,
including explosions and numerous boats, creates seismic noise underneath the water that can
travel for extended distances. 99 Noise can impact whales by changing their vocalizations,
respiration, swim speed, foraging behavior, and also by causing shifts in migration paths. 100
Beluga whales have been shown to be particularly sensitive to noise and surveys have
demonstrated large disturbances from drilling have caused a decline in the number of whales
spotted in their native region.101 The impact of the noise pollution during the summer drilling
season could cause devastating effects for the migration and reproduction of beluga whales,
bowhead whales, and other mammals that the Inupiat depend upon for survival.
Second, the remoteness and unpredictable weather in the Chukchi Sea greatly increase
the risks of a spill. The Arctic drilling season is confined to the summer months, but many
difficulties remain because of the unpredictable weather and the impact of floating ice. 102
Opponents of drilling in the Arctic Circle fear that if a spill occurred in this remote area the time

See Letter from Mike Daulton et al., VP/Dir. of Policy, Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, to Tommy P. Beaudreau, Dir.,
Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt. Headquarters, 7 (Dec. 3, 2013),
http://ak.audubon.org/sites/default/files/documents/chukchi_call_comments_and_appendices_3dec2013.pdf
(discussing that summer months serve as the feeding grounds for grey whales and a habitat for beluga whales).
91
Id.; see also Robert S. Suydam & John C. George, Subsistence Harvest of Bowhead Whales (Balaena Mysticetus)
by Alaskan Eskimos: 1974 to 2003, DEP’T OF WILDLIFE MGMT., 2-3 http://www.northslope.org/assets/images/uploads/1974-2003%20Village_harv%20BRG12.pdf (mentioning that summer is also whale
hunting season for the Inupiat).
92
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it would take for a response crew would result in complete devastation of ecosystem.103 In
addition, the World Wildlife Fund has warned that there is no “proven effective method for
containing and cleaning up an oil spill in icy water.” 104 The Exxon Valdez spill in 1989
demonstrated that the low temperatures and limited sunlight can lead to an oil spill causing
mortality in the ecosystem in the Arctic Circle. It is unclear if Shell is prepared for the potentially
devastating effects of a spill on the Inupiat who depend upon the ecosystem for survival. 105
V. DISCUSSION – OPPORTUNITIES AND BARRIERS FOR A § 1983 CLAIM
A. Shell’s Deprivation of the Inupiat’s Constitutionally Protected Interests
First, to succeed under § 1983 the Inupiat must prove that they have a constitutionally
protected interest sufficient to trigger a remedy. The interest must be encompassed by the 14th
Amendment’s protection of liberty and property because § 1983 is exclusively a mechanism for
enforcing constitutional and statutory rights. 106 Section 1983 does not create any substantive
rights.107 To demonstrate a protectable property interest “a person must have more than an
abstract need or desire for it or a unilateral expectation of it . . . it is a purpose . . . to protect those
claims upon which people rely in their daily lives.”108 The property interest does not come
directly from the Constitution, but rather it stems from an independent source, such as state
law.109 A liberty interest may derive from the Constitution itself because the word “liberty”
confers implicit guarantees or may arise from an expectation drawn from state laws. 110
The doctrine is not intended to protect individuals from every government action, but
only “prevents governmental power from being used for purposes of oppression, or abuse of
government power that shocks the conscience, or action that is legally irrational in that it is not
sufficiently keyed to any legitimate state interests.” 111 The Supreme Court focuses on the need to
find a congressional intent to create a federally protected right. 112 The “plaintiff must assert a
violation of a federal right, not merely a violation of federal law.” 113 The Supreme Court outlined
three factors to determine if a statutory provision produces a federal right: 114 (1) Congress must
have intended the provision to benefit the plaintiff; 115 (2) the plaintiff bears the burden to show
103
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the right is not “so ‘vague and amorphous’ that its enforcement would strain judicial
competence;”116 and (3) the statute must clearly impose a “binding obligation on the States.” 117
Due process is a flexible concept intended to mirror and evolve with the varying situations
confronting groups of citizens. 118 The Court’s interpretation of a protected right often narrows
the scope of § 1983’s protection and leaves certain minority plaintiffs without a remedy. The
Court’s balancing and narrowing of the protected interest moves away from the plain language
and expansive purpose of § 1983 to protect minority groups from abusive state practices.
1. Property Interest in the Form of Aboriginal Title
First, Native Alaskans could argue they have a property interest in the region in their
continued hunting abilities stemming from aboriginal title. The right would derive from the
Inupiat’s continued occupation and subsistence in the Arctic Circle for several thousand years.
The Inupiat have long been some of the world’s most marine-oriented hunters. 119 They would
assert that tribes have the right to hunt and fish on the reservation as the normal incidents of
Indian life.120 The historical roots of the Inupiat’s occupancy extend prior to the foundation of
the United States; such longstanding property rights should be protected from infringement.
Shell’s drilling not only occupies the Inupiat’s territory, but also significantly limits access to
one of their main sources of food. Shell’s permit makes clear that they can “take” whales in the
process of drilling. 121 The “taking” in the permit is non-lethal, but includes disrupting the
animals with noise pollution, breaking the ice that serves as the habitat for seals and polar bears,
and an influx of ocean traffic due to drilling activities. 122 The disruption of these animals will
mean that the Inupiat’s source of food will be driven from the region. The breaking up of sea ice
also destroys the Inupiat hunting camp locations, making it impossible for the Inupiat to hunt
from those areas, which they used to make base camps on the ice. Hunting and fishing are
traditional parts of Native Alaskan life and Shell’s drilling will inhibit the continuation of this
tradition. In addition, Shell’s occupation of the region infringes upon the ocean traditionally
occupied by the Inupiat. The Inupiat occupy the Chukchi Sea for whaling camps and hunting.
Despite the strong normative concerns for the continuation of the Inupiat’s occupancy,
the jurisprudence surrounding Native Alaskan property claims creates a complicated landscape
for a plaintiff to navigate. First, the type of property right given to Native Americans is known as
Indian Title. The Supreme Court in Johnson v. M’Intosh decided that the federal government
owned title to a disputed piece of land and limited the Indian’s stake in the land to merely a title
of occupancy, known as Indian Title.123 Only the federal government can extinguish the
indigenous people’s occupation, however Native Tribes have no vendible interest in the land. 124
116
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The federal government does not have to provide compensation upon terminating the right to
occupancy; however, if there has been congressional recognition of legal rights to the land the
federal government may compensate for the land.125 States cannot take title from the Native
Alaskans, unless it is ratified by the federal government.126 The Inupiat’s continued right to
occupancy is contingent upon Congress’s inaction to extinguish. Indian Title is a vulnerable
property right that is subordinate to federal interests.
The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act extinguished many indigenous property rights.
In Inupiat Community of Arctic Slope v. United States, Native Alaskans sued to enjoin oil
development off the shore of the North Slope based upon a claim of aboriginal title due to
occupancy and use of the sea ice for subsistence hunting and fishing. 127 The Ninth Circuit held
that the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act extinguished the Inupiat’s aboriginal rights. 128 The
Alaska District Court held the Inupiat have no claim to Indian title for off-shore oil drilling
because the federal government has exclusive sovereignty over the ocean and mineral rights in
the sea.129 Tribal rights and tribal sovereignty are subordinate to the federal government and the
Court held the tribe cannot make a claim at odds with those rights entrusted to the federal
government.130 Based upon this line of precedent, the Inupiat’s claim for Indian title as a
property right has been extinguished.
Yet, the Inupiat’s claim for hunting and fishing rights could still possibly succeed. In
1989, after Inupiat Community, the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit recognized that the
phrase “in Alaska” from the Native American Claim Settlement Act extinguishes only aboriginal
titles within the boundaries of the state and does not include the area of the Outer Continental
Shelf.131 Therefore, Native Alaskan hunting and fishing rights in the Outer Continental Shelf are
not extinguished. 132 The Inupiat’s strongest claim is their protected property right in the
continuation of their hunting and fishing practices because this right is not extinguished and
Shell’s taking of the whales and other animals in the Chukchi Sea could constitute an
infringement of this protected right. This right will be weighed against the federal government’s
interest in the region to determine if those interests extinguish the Inupiat’s rights of occupation
and use of the Sea. 133 The federal government will cite the nation’s need for increased energy
independence and the United States’ military demand for oil. Nonetheless, despite these federal
interests, the Inupiat may have a protected property interest in their hunting and fishing rights in
the Chukchi Sea.
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2. First Amendment Free Exercise Clause
Another potential avenue for the Inupiat to establish a federally protected interest is
through the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. 134 The right to practice religion is one
of the foundational and most zealously guarded rights in American society.135 Courts have
continuously protected the right of free exercise from being “trammeled by the state.” 136 The
Supreme Court has explained that the Free Exercise Clause prohibits the government from
coercing people into violating their religious beliefs or penalizing them by denying them the
rights, benefits, and privileges given to other citizens.137 Although the Inupiat’s belief system is a
minor religion with fewer followers than major religions such as Christianity, courts cannot
determine that a set of beliefs are not religious just because they do not agree with their views or
find them peculiar. 138 To determine if a religion is afforded protection under the First
Amendment, courts must determine the beliefs “are (1) sincerely held, and (2) religious in
nature.”139
The Inupiat’s claim would rest upon their religious beliefs and ceremonies revolving
around their subsistence upon whales in the Chukchi Sea. The plaintiffs would have to
demonstrate that the specific area Shell occupies in the Chukchi Sea has religious significance
and that drilling will interfere with their exercise of religion. 140 The Free Exercise Clause
prohibits religious observers from unequal treatment. 141 To satisfy the court’s requirements to
demonstrate unequal treatment the Inupiat could argue that Shell’s new rigs interfere with the
locations of their whaling outposts for their hunting expeditions. Whaling often occurs many
miles from shore, near the location of Shell’s new drilling operations, just beyond the three-mile
mark from the shore near the Inupiat settlement of Borrow. 142
Once the Inupiat demonstrate the overlap of Shell’s exploratory drilling with their
hunting locations, the Inupiat would need to prove the religious significance of these sites. One
of the strongest arguments involves the influence of whaling and whales on the traditional
religious ceremonies; without the whales the Inupiat religion would cease to exist. The Inupiat
134
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believe that their land was once a sacred whale and the whale served as the foundation of their
community.143 Ceremonies throughout the year, including the Spring Whale Distribution,
Whaling Festival, Fall Whale Distribution, and the Bladder Festival, seek to bring together
spiritually the animals and humans. 144 Each whale hunt brings forth sacrifice rituals celebrating
the animal spirits who sacrificed themselves to sustain the Inupiat. The sacrifice rituals include
shaman healers who connect the community with the dead and the gods, and after the ceremony
healers are often honored with the whale’s flipper.145 The Inupiat could argue that BOEM’s
approval of Shell’s plan which outlines the “taking” of whales deprives the indigenous people of
the ability to practice their religion. 146 The “taking” includes the disruption of whales’ migration
paths, which will decrease the number of whales in the region. 147 If the noise pollution causes
significant changes in migration and mating patterns, the Inupiat will not be able continue their
religious traditions.
The Supreme Court addressed a similar issue in Lyng, where three Native American
tribes challenged the construction of a road and timbering in an area that was an “integral and
indispensable part of Indian religious conceptualization and practice.” 148 The Native American
tribes argued that the road would diminish the sacredness of the area, create distractions, and
destroy the environmental conditions necessary for their religious practices. 149 The Supreme
Court majority invalidated the injunction against the government’s construction of the road,
reasoning that the road did not coerce conduct inconsistent with the Native American’s religious
belief or penalize them for their religious practice. 150 The majority compared measures taken by
the government to avoid disrupting the sacred places with the interests of the Native
Americans.151 The Court reasoned if the injunction were upheld it would be essentially giving
the tribes ownership over the federal land. 152 The dissent countered that the majority leaves the
Native Americans no constitutional protections against a grave threat to their religious practices
in the area that have continued for 200 years. 153
It will be difficult for the Inupiat to overcome the precedent of Lyng. To support a § 1983
claim, the Inupiat must convince the court that the Inupiat’s religious beliefs outweigh the
government’s interest in developing the area for oil and gas. 154 This is difficult because the
region in the Chukchi Sea has the potential to be a huge source of oil, which could provide the
United States energy independence for many years.155 Further, Shell will counter that the
exploratory drilling does not deprive the Inupiat of every form of religious exercise, but rather
Chie Sakakibara, “Our Home is Drowning”: Inupiat Storytelling and Climate Change in Point Hope, Alaska, 98
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only infringes upon their ability to hunt whales and explore the sea. 156 Courts will look into the
extent to which the “spiritual practices would become ineffectual” from Shell’s drilling. 157 The
number of people who practice the Inupiat religion will implicitly be taken into account in the
courts’ weighing of interests. The Inupiat represent a minority religion, which poses a unique
challenge for the courts. 158 Despite the plain language of the First Amendment and § 1983 as a
means to enforce the religious right, the Supreme Court’s precedent narrows the broad language
through balancing tests and cases like Lyng, which makes it extraordinarily difficult for plaintiffs
to succeed.
Additionally, as the Court acknowledged in Lyng, the religious interest cannot essentially
confer ownership of the Chukchi Sea to the Inupiat.159 The federal government has ownership
over all of the mineral rights in that ocean region, meaning that inhibiting drilling would in some
ways give the Inupiat ownership and control. 160 Due to the Court’s balancing of interests, it is
unlikely that the Inupiat’s religious freedom argument will succeed.
Granted, Lyng was decided prior to the passage of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA), which changed the landscape for religious freedom claims. RFRA provides that the
Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion . . .
[except the] Government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion
only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person (1) is in
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive
means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. 161
RFRA defines religious exercise as “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or
central to, a system of religious belief.” 162 Additionally, RFRA clarifies that the “use . . . of real
property for the purpose of religious exercise” also falls within the definition of religious
exercise.163
However, RFRA does not substantially change the hurdles facing the Inupiat in bringing
a religious freedom claim that Lyng highlighted. In Navajo Nation v. United States Forest
Service, Indian tribes and environmental groups brought a claim against the Forest Service for
their authorization of the use of recycled wastewater to make artificial snow for a ski resort on a
mountain considered sacred by the tribes. 164 The Ninth Circuit held that the action did not
“substantially burden” the petitioner’s religious exercise. 165 The court explained that “[u]nder
RFRA, a ‘substantial burden’ is imposed only when individuals are forced to choose between
following the tenets of their religion and receiving a governmental benefit or coerced to act
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contrary to their religious beliefs by the threat of civil or criminal sanctions.” 166 The tribes in
Navajo Nation were not forced to choose or coerced, but rather the use of recycled water was
“offensive to the Plaintiffs’ religious sensibilities.” 167 The Ninth Circuit cited Lyng to support the
proposition that “the diminishment of spiritual fulfillment . . . is not a ‘substantial burden’ on the
free exercise of religion.”168 Therefore, the passage of RFRA does not impact the incredible
difficulty for the Inupiat to prove a religious freedom claim against drilling in the Chukchi Sea.
Nonetheless, religious freedom is a fundamental right in the United States, which
conveys some traction to the Inupiat’s argument. “The right to the free exercise of religion is a
precious American invention, distinguishing our Constitution from all prior national
constitutions.”169 The Court will have to balance the interests in increasing the United States’
energy independence with the preservation of Native Alaskan religion and culture. The Court’s
balancing approach to protected rights moves away from the broad language of the First
Amendment; instead the balancing approach suggests protecting only those religious freedoms
that the Court deems to outweigh the government interest in the action. This kind of balancing
moves away from the expansive purpose of § 1983 to protect minority individuals from abusive
state action. A balancing approach leads to outcomes the Court finds beneficial, but those often
do not align with the protections intended by § 1983.
B. State Action
For a § 1983 claim to be successful, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the complained-of
action can be attributed to the state. The Inupiat must prove that Shell acted “under color of state
law.” Under § 1983, to find that a defendant acted under the color of state law, the Court must
find “such a ‘close nexus between the State and the challenged action’ that the challenged action
‘may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.’” 170 Under San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc.,
extensive regulation by the government does not transform the actions of a regulated entity into
those of the government. 171 The government “can be held responsible for a private decision only
when it has exercised coercive power or has provided such significant encouragement, either
overt or covert that the choice must in law be deemed that of the government.” 172
Although Shell is a private actor, the state encouraged their drilling actions and granted
permits under state law. The Inupiat’s claim will have to be framed in a way that emphasizes the
connections between Shell and the Alaskan government. The Inupiat will not succeed by solely
demonstrating that Shell received permits and leases from the state of Alaska and BOEM. The
entwinement must go beyond extensive regulation and transform into coercive power or
encouragement.
The economy of Alaska has become increasingly influenced by the ebbs and flows of the
oil industry.173 The energy industry, including leaders like Shell, accounts for a large portion of
166
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United States business investment and Standard & Poor’s (S&P) spending. The S&P 500 is an
index of 500 stocks that is a leading indicator of the United States’ economy. 174 The energy
industry accounts for one third of the S&P 500’s net capital expenditure or capex spending in the
United States.175 Therefore, the energy industry, due to its impact on spending in the U.S.
market, greatly impacts overall economic growth and recovery. 176 Further, over thirty-three
percent of Alaska’s jobs are tied to oil and gas. 177 The oil industry provides much needed
revenue, taxes, and jobs to Alaska, a state with one of the country’s highest unemployment
rates.178 Money derived from the oil industry makes up ninety percent of Alaska’s budget and
provides dividend checks to Alaskans. 179 Uniquely, Alaska owns its oil reserves, meaning the
state is entitled to royalties on production. 180 As the oil prices fall or companies stop drilling in
Alaska, the state’s income also drops leading to cuts in school funding, health care, and law
enforcement.181 The Inupiat could convincingly argue that Shell and Alaska are inextricably
connected through the income derived from drilling. The local economy, as well as many public
benefits, are contingent upon the continued successful drilling of Alaska’s oil reserves.
In addition to the general economic benefits for Alaska and Shell from the drilling,
Alaska has tax incentives for oil companies to develop in the North Slope region to “encourage
exploration and development of Alaska’s oil and gas resources.” 182 Alaska provides tax credits,
subsidies, and tax incentives for oil companies. 183 The tax credits focus on investment in drilling
expenditures and seek to counter the risks and expenses companies fear when investing in
Alaska.184 In 2014, Alaska’s largest tax break of $492 million was split between companies
based upon oil production in the North Slope. 185 The tax benefit for oil companies in Alaska has
been compared to receiving free money and has encouraged oil development in the region. 186
The Inupiat in their § 1983 claim could use these tax breaks and credits as evidence of the state’s
encouragement of Shell, a private actor, to satisfy the state action doctrine. 187 This argument
would demonstrate that Alaska encourages oil companies through incentives in the hope that it
will boost their economy. These actions lead to an inference that Shell’s actions are readily
attributable to the state of Alaska.
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The Inupiat’s potential argument that Shell satisfies the state action doctrine based upon
the benefits to Alaska’s economy and tax incentives could be successful. Several courts have
considered tax-exempt organizations as state action, especially when racial discrimination is at
issue.188 However, the Supreme Court ruled that funding is not enough because a private actor
who receives money from the government can be viewed as a contractor and therefore not a state
actor.189 In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, the Supreme Court found that when the
state is working for a mutually beneficial goal and leases the space to a private actor the state
action requirement is satisfied. 190 In Crissman v. Dover Downs Entertainment Inc., the Third
Circuit distinguished their case from Burton by stating that even though a state agency
subsidized a private business’s facilities, the owner and state were not conducting the operation
together in a mutually beneficial manner. 191 The court emphasized that the location of the
business was not owned or leased by the state to hold there was no state action.192
The Inupiat’s claim against Shell is analogous to Burton.193 Alaska needs Shell’s revenue,
the drilling takes place on government property on lease to a private actor, and the state
financially benefits from Shell’s discriminatory conduct. These three factors demonstrate that the
drilling in the Chukchi Sea is mutually beneficial for Shell and Alaska. Based upon the
substantial benefits to Alaska from drilling, the fact that Shell drills on Alaskan land, and the tax
incentives, the Inupiat could succeed in arguing that Shell’s action can be fairly attributable to
the state to fulfill the state action doctrine.
In the alternative, the Inupiat could sue the state of Alaska or the BOEM for the issuance
of permits to Shell. Alaska was clearly acting “under the color of state law,” and therefore
would satisfy the state action requirement of § 1983.
VI. CONCLUSION
For Native Alaskans, achieving a remedy under § 1983 is a difficult battle. Similar to
many discrimination suits, the claim likely would be dismissed early in the litigation under Rule
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.194 Unfortunately, many normative concerns do not align with
the law’s purview. As a society, many are concerned about the historical significance of
destroying Native Alaskan culture and communities. Many people see a fundamental unfairness
in the disproportionate impact these communities bear because of our dependence on natural
resources. In addition, a growing concern for climate change and the environmental impacts of
human consumption leaves those communities most at risk without a remedy in the law.
We are left to wonder if discrimination law is not helping the Inupiat, some of our
nation’s first people, then who is it here to help? The legislative intent and original purpose
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behind a statute like § 1983 was to provide a remedy for abusive state policies that
disproportionately burden minority groups.
One purpose of anti-discrimination law is anti-balkanization.195 Reva Siegel argues that
anti-discrimination law seeks to prevent racial divisiveness. 196 She contends that Justices affirm
racially-neutral policies as long as they do “not make race so salient as to affront dignity and
threaten divisiveness.”197 In light of anti-balkinazation, the case for Native Alaskans is
paramount to this goal. Shell’s actions in the Arctic Circle threaten to destroy a culture that has
persisted for thousands of years. The actions of Alaska, Shell, and the Nation in approving of
these exploratory drilling projects sends a message that Native Alaskan dignity and culture is
worth less than our drive for oil. If we continue to allow the potential for profits to overrun the
value of human dignity, we are left to ask: what is the value of life, liberty, and property in the
United States?
Another purpose of anti-discrimination law is to remedy group inequalities, prevent
dignitary harm, and stigmatize discrimination. 198 The dignitary harm caused to all Native
Alaskans by Shell’s destruction of the Inupiat’s home reduces the personhood of the Native
Alaskans to something that can be bought and traded. Shell’s action takes away the Inupiat’s
property, destroys their source of subsistence, and inhibits their religious practice. If taking away
a person’s property, source of food, and religion does not constitute a dignitary harm then it is
not clear what does. Shell’s actions essentially eliminate the Inupiat’s dignity and personhood by
leaving them without the fundamental building blocks of their culture and way of life. As the
impacts of drilling and climate change intensify the Northern Alaskan region will be
uninhabitable due to rising seas and loss of sources of food. Section 1983 has failed to protect the
Inupiat from this devastating harm and fulfill its purpose.
In order for § 1983 to live up to its purpose, courts need to interpret the statute based
upon its original language. The plain language of the statute is broad to support the Inupiat’s
claim against Shell, but the jurisprudence creates insurmountable obstacles. Because § 1983 does
not provide an independent protectable right, plaintiffs, like the Inupiat, are forced to search for
an outside source of law to support their claim. As discussed, often these outside sources do not
align with the goals of § 1983 and fail to protect minority interests. In order for § 1983 to
succeed courts must interpret outside sources, such as the First Amendment, broadly to allow
plaintiffs like the Inupiat to litigate their claims. The Court’s continued limitation of § 1983’s
reach through outside sources of law contravenes the purpose and plain language of the statute.
Courts should return to the clear language and purpose behind § 1983 to allow environmental
justice claims to survive. Advocates and courts need to use the statute as it was originally
intended to remedy environmental discrimination. By returning to the roots of § 1983, it will
begin to provide the strong protection for minorities that the drafters intended.
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